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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that
state courts have the power to interpret state constitutions to be more
protective of civil liberties than the Federal Constitution.1 Many state
courts have exercised this power by independently interpreting state
constitutional provisions as a means to afford their own citizens
greater individual rights than those guaranteed by the Federal Bill of
Rights.2
Washington is among the many states whose courts have tradi-
tionally examined their own constitutions on issues involving individ-
ual rights without assuming that the United States Supreme Court is
the final word on such matters.' Washington's courts and commenta-
tors alike have recognized that independent interpretation and applica-
tion of the state's constitution is an obligation that all Washington
* J.D. Candidate 2002, Seattle University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
2. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Former Supreme Court Justice Brennan argues that states
fulfill their essential role in our federal system when they engage in independent state protection
of individual liberties. Id. at 503. He points out numerous examples where states have under-
taken this role and relied on their own constitutions to protect individual liberties. Id. at 498-
501.
3. See generally Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on
State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491
(1984). Former Washington State Supreme Court Justice Utter provides a detailed examination
of Washington's tradition of independent state constitutional interpretation, citing many in-
stances where Washington's courts followed this tradition. Id. at 499-504.
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courts owe to all Washington citizens.4 In fact, the Washington State
Supreme Court in State v. Gunwall' fashioned a framework to guide
the state courts in determining whether to engage in independent state
constitutional interpretation.
6
In accordance with the principle that state courts may interpret
their own constitutions more liberally than the Federal Constitution
and grant broader protections to their citizens, numerous state courts
have held that religion-based peremptory challenges are forbidden un-
der their respective state constitutions. 7 These holdings deviate from
the current stance of the United States Supreme Court, which has sub
silentio recognized that religion-based peremptory challenges do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8
Although Washington courts have yet to address the constitu-
tionality of religion-based peremptory challenges, this Comment seeks
to establish that such peremptory challenges violate Article I, § 11 of
the Washington State Constitution.9 The pertinent portion of that
section provides that no person "shall ... be incompetent as a witness
or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion .... ","
Thus, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refusal to directly rule on
whether religion-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, Article I, § 11 of the Washington State Constitution
appears to provide independent state constitutional grounds for re-
solving the issue.
An analysis under State v. Gunwall, the Washington framework
for independent state constitutional interpretation, demonstrates that
it is appropriate for Washington courts not only to determine the con-
stitutionality of religion-based peremptory challenges independently
of the Federal Constitution, but also to extend greater protection to
Washington citizens in this area of law. The command of Article I, §
11 and the results of a Gunwall analysis establish that, as an independ-
4. Id. at 499; see also Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230,
238, 635 P.2d 108, 113 (1981).
5. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
6. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 811. This case establishes six non-exclusive factors for courts
to analyze in deciding whether it is appropriate to grant independent protection to individuals
under the Washington State Constitution. See discussion infra Part III(C).
7. Susan Hightower, Note, Sex and the Peremptory Strike: An Empirical Analysis of J.E.B. v.
Alabama's First Five Years, 52 STAN. L. REV. 895, 902 (2000) (listing the states that have found
religion-based peremptory challenges impermissible: California; Colorado; Connecticut; Florida;
Hawaii; Massachusetts; Mississippi; New Jersey; New York; and North Carolina).
8. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1994) (denying certiorari when asked to decide
the issue of whether religion-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause);
see also discussion infra Part 1(D).




ent source of individual rights for all Washingtonians, the Washing-
ton State Constitution prohibits religion-based peremptory challenges.
This Comment will first define the peremptory challenge and
discuss its history and normative values. It will then examine the
United States Supreme Court's treatment of the peremptory challenge,
focusing on how the peremptory challenge has changed from a litiga-
tion device that lawyers could exercise without explanation to one that
at times requires an explanation for it to survive constitutional chal-
lenge. Next, this Comment will discuss state courts' independent in-
terpretation of fundamental rights, Washington courts' decisions in
harmony with this principle, and State v. Gunwall, the guide to inde-
pendent constitutional interpretation in Washington. This Comment
will show that under a Gunwall analysis, religion-based peremptory
challenges violate Article I, § 11 of the Washington State Constitution.
Finally, this Comment will provide a new standard for evaluating re-
ligion-based peremptory challenges in Washington while ensuring
that the peremptory challenge remains a useful instrument in jury se-
lection.
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Peremptory Challenges: Definition, History, and Normative Values
A peremptory challenge and a challenge for cause are the two
methods by which a party may eliminate a prospective juror during
voir dire.1 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 2 one could define a peremptory challenge as "one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to
the court's control."' 3  In contrast, a challenge for cause permits a
party to dismiss a member of the venire only "on a narrowly specified,
provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality."' 4
While a peremptory challenge is designed to permit a party to
strike a member of the venire on nothing more than a hunch regarding
the juror's partiality,' 5 a challenge for cause requires a party to demon-
strate the prospective juror's objective bias before a judge will dismiss
11. FED. R. CIv. P. 47; see also JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 47.20-.30 (3d ed. 1999).
12. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (finding that race-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal
Protection Clause). See discussion infra Part II(B).
13. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
14. Id. The challenge for cause is "narrowly confined to instances in which threats to im-
partiality are admitted or presumed from the relationships, pecuniary interests, or clear biases of
a prospective juror." MOORE ET AL., supra note 11, 47.20.
1S. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
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the individual. 6 Although a party can exercise an unlimited number
of challenges for cause, 7 the requisite objective standard of proof
makes them difficult to sustain." Thus, peremptory challenges,
though limited in number,19 are a treasured tool for the party that de-
sires to dismiss a juror but is unable to do so for cause.
The peremptory challenge originated in England approximately
700 years ago, arrived with the colonists in America, and soon found
its way into federal and state statutes. 20  Although Congress has au-
thorized the use of peremptory challenges in federal courts 2' and all
states have authorized their use in state courts,22 nothing in the Fed-
eral Constitution provides for the existence of peremptory chal-
lenges. 23 Therefore, unlike the challenge for cause, which is grounded
in the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury,24 the power
to employ a peremptory challenge emanates from various statutes, not
from the Constitution. 25
The lack of a constitutional basis notwithstanding, the peremp-
tory challenge is still viewed as a useful instrument for molding a more
impartial jury.26 Justification for the peremptory challenge is based on
the presumption that such challenge can help remove bias from the
jury when the bias it purports to eliminate is inarticulable.27 Parties on
both sides of a case may exercise peremptory challenges to exclude
16. Id. "The central inquiry in examining a challenge for cause is whether the prospective
juror holds a particular position, belief, or opinion that prevents or substantially impairs the im-
partial performance of the duties ofjuror." MOORE ET AL., supra note 11, 47.20.
17. Coburn R. Beck, Note, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 961, 964 (1998).
18. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 11, 47.20. A juror is presumed to be impartial unless
he or she falls into one of the narrowly defined categories of legally cognizable bias. See discus-
sion supra note 14.
19. Beck, supra note 17, at 964.
20. See id. at 965; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The peremptory's importance is confirmed by its persistence: It
was well established at the time of Blackstone and continues to endure in all the States.").
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2001) (providing that "each party shall be entitled to three peremp-
tory challenges" in civil cases). FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b) provides that a civil court "shall allow the
number of peremptory challenges provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1870." In criminal trials, the number
of peremptory challenges depends on the offense charged: capital trials entitle each side to twenty
peremptory challenges; felony trials entitle the government and the defendant to six and ten per-
emptory challenges respectively; and misdemeanor trials entitle each side to three peremptory
challenges. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
22. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 147.
23. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988).
25. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
26. Id.
27. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("That a trial lawyer's instinctive
assessment of a juror's predisposition cannot meet the high standards of a challenge for cause
does not mean that the lawyer's instinct is erroneous.").
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those members of the venire who they suspect are either partial to-
wards the other party or prejudiced against them.28 By eliminating
these extremes of partiality common to any venire, the parties' exercise
of peremptory strikes results in a jury that is more likely to be impar-
tial.29
In addition to creating a more impartial jury, the peremptory
challenge contributes to the appearance of impartiality.3" Although
the claim that peremptory challenges actually create a more impartial
jury is not universally accepted, there is less doubt that such chal-
lenges impress upon parties that the jury will decide the case impar-
tially.3" The mere process of striking members of the venire based on
nothing more than a surmise of bias strengthens the litigants' belief
that the selected jury will arrive at a fair result.
3 2
Another beneficial feature of the peremptory challenge is the
alacrity with which it allows voir dire to proceed.3 The peremptory
challenge expedites voir dire by reducing a litigant's need to exten-
sively probe every juror for bias to justify a challenge for cause. 4 A
party may forego a challenge for cause that is unlikely to succeed and
remove the prospective juror with a peremptory challenge."
Because a party need not justify every dismissal of a member of
the venire, the peremptory challenge also makes extensive and poten-
tially intrusive questioning during voir dire less necessary. 6 A lawyer
who suspects that a potential juror is biased and that further question-
ing will fail to expose such bias may elect to use a peremptory chal-
lenge instead of pursuing a challenge for cause.37 Also, if a party pur-
sues a challenge for cause and fails to establish that a particular
member is biased, the party may then strike the potential juror if for
28. Id. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. Id. ("Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes
will be most partial toward the other side, are a means of eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on
both sides, thereby assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.") (quoting Holland v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990)).
30. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
31. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 n. 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Wise observers have long under-
stood that the appearance of justice is as important as its reality. If the system of peremptory
strikes affects the actual impartiality of the jury not a bit, but gives litigants a greater belief in
that impartiality, it serves a most important function. In point of fact, that may well be its
greater value.") (citation omitted).
32. Id.
33. A.C. Johnstone, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administration of the Batson
Rule, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 444 (1998).
34. See id. at 445.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 444.
37. See id.
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no other reason than to avoid placing an irritated member of the venire
on the jury.38
As demonstrated above, the benefits flowing from the availability
of the peremptory challenge are made possible by its unrestricted na-
ture. Despite the benefits of an unrestricted peremptory challenge, the
Supreme Court has nevertheless limited its exercise in instances where
its use would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Race-Based Peremptory Challenges at the Federal Level
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue as to whether the
use of peremptory challenges may at times violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in its 1965 decision, Swain v. Alabama.3  In Swain, a
criminal defendant alleged that a prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to prevent African Americans from sitting on a jury violated
the Equal Protection Clause."0 Justice White reasoned for the major-
ity that "[i]n the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and
white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged
without cause."41 The Court held that elimination of prospective ju-
rors on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause only if
the challenging party can establish that the prosecutor used the per-
emptory challenge in a systematic fashion, in trial after trial, to dis-
criminate against a particular race regardless of the circumstances of
each case.42
More than twenty years later, in 1986, the Supreme Court over-
ruled Swain by limiting a prosecutor's unrestrained use of peremptory
challenges in Batson v. Kentucky. 3 Finding the Swain requirement of
extensive proof of systematic discrimination to be untenable, the
Court concluded that a minority defendant can establish a prosecu-
tor's impermissible race-discriminatory use of the peremptory chal-
lenge by merely adducing evidence from his or her particular trial.44
The Court held that a prosecutor who strikes of a member of the ve-
nire on the basis of race or on the assumption that members of a par-
38. See id.
39. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
40. Id. at 209.
41. Id. at221.
42. Id. at 223-24. Under Swain, a defendant could not prove a race-based peremptory
challenge merely by showing discrimination in his or her own case, even if the prosecutor struck
every African American from the jury. The Court demanded evidence that the prosecutor in
question had an established pattern of using race-based peremptory challenges that were inexpli-
cable as trial strategy.
43. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
44. Id. at 96.
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ticular race are unable to remain impartial violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.4"
Specifically, under Batson, to establish a prosecutor's race-
discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge prohibited under the
Equal Protection Clause, a criminal defendant must show (1) "that he
is a member of a cognizable racial group,"(2) that the prosecutor used
a peremptory challenge on a member of the defendant's race, and (3)
that such a challenge and "any other relevant circumstances" give rise
to an inference that the prosecutor's actions were racially motivated.4"
Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof
shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for
the peremptory challenge." Although the explanation may be less
than that required to establish a challenge for cause, the explanation
must be "neutral" and "related to the particular case to be tried."48
After the explanation is offered, the trial court must assess its legiti-
macy and must rule accordingly.49
The Supreme Court did not limit its Batson holding to cases
where a prosecutor uses a peremptory strike to discriminate against a
member of the defendant's race. It first extended Batson's scope in its
1991 decision, Powers v. Ohio,"° where it held that "a criminal defen-
dant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through
peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded
jurors share the same race."'" The Court relied on principles of third-
party standing to extend the right of a Batson challenge to white de-
fendants.5 2 In doing so, it built upon its explicit recognition in Batson
that racial discrimination in the context of jury selection harms the ju-
ror and the community as much as it harms the defendant. 3
Later in the same year, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,5
4
the Court held that the use of a race-based peremptory challenge may
violate the Equal Protection Clause in civil as well as in criminal
45. Id. at 89.
46. Id. at 96.
47. Id. at 97.
48. Id. at 98.
49. Id.
50. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
51. Id. at 402.
52. Id. at 415.
53. Id. at 406 (Kennedy, J.) ("Batson recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the community at large. The opportunity
for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as
one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system.") (citation omitted); see also Bat-
son, 476 U.S. at 87 (Powell, J.) ("Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons
from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.").
54. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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cases. 5 Although civil cases usually involve only a dispute between
private parties, an area normally beyond the bounds of the Constitu-
tion, "governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an ex-
tent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of
the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional con-
straints." 6 Because private litigants in civil trials exercise peremptory
challenges under governmental authority, those parties are state actors
and are subject to the same constitutional constraints on the use of
race-based peremptory challenges as in the criminal context.
5 7
The Supreme Court completed its attempt to eradicate racial dis-
crimination in the jury selection process in its 1992 decision, Georgia
v. McCollum. 8 According to the McCollum Court, the Constitution
also forbids a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful dis-
crimination through use of race-based peremptory challenges.59 The
principles espoused in Batson, Powers, and Edmonson formed the
foundation for the McCollum Court's conclusion that even a criminal
defendant is "bound by the constitutional mandate of race neutrality"
when "wielding the power to choose a quintessential governmental
body. "60
Batson and its progeny illustrate how the Supreme Court ex-
tended its Batson holding to areas where the peremptory challenge
may serve as a race-discriminatory tool. However, the Court did not
address whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids gender-based
peremptory challenges until its 1994 decision, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
TB.
61
C. Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges at the Federal Level
In J. E. B., the putative father in a paternity and child support suit
argued that Alabama's use of peremptory challenges against males
violated the Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the use was based
solely on gender.62 The Supreme Court concluded that purposeful
"discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the
Equal Protection Clause, particularly where ... the discrimination
serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic,. and overbroad
55. Id. at 628.
56. Id. at 620.
57. Id. at 628.
58. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
59. Id. at 59.
60. Id. at 54.
61. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
62. Id. at 129.
[Vol. 25:451
Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges
stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women."63 Extend-
ing Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges worried those who
feared the eventual elimination of all peremptory challenges. Thus,
the Court insisted that J.E.B. neither sounded the death knell of the
peremptory challenge nor extended Batson to other groups that are
usually subject to review under the Equal Protection Clause.64
Those who did not join the majority opinion, however, were un-
persuaded by the majority's qualification and emphasized that the ma-
jority's holding would have ramifications beyond the decision.65 For
example, Justice Scalia in dissent predicted that J.E. B. would become
the latest rallying point from which to extend the panoply of equal
protection rights to other groups, thus further eroding a method of
jury selection, which, by definition, is supposed to be unrestricted.66
Furthermore, because every use of a peremptory challenge may poten-
tially lead to a gender-based challenge, a situation avoided in Batson
challenges due to the demographic realities of race, trial courts would
face an inundation of collateral litigation and a lengthening of the voir
dire process.
67
The parade of horribles predicted by Justice Scalia has yet to ar-
rive, as the consequence of J.E.B. has been far less dramatic than pre-
dicted. Indeed, the claim that every peremptory strike will involve a
potential gender-discrimination challenge is based on misplaced
logic. 68 Of course, members of either gender will usually outnumber
members of a particular race on the venire. However, this creates
more difficulty, not less, in establishing a prima facie case for gender
discrimination.69 The likely presence of equal numbers of men and
women on the venire suggests that a gender claim will arise only in
more obvious instances where members of a particular sex are struck
repeatedly.7" Conversely, in instances of race-based peremptory chal-
lenges, the demographic reality of fewer members of that race makes a
prima facie case easier to recognize and establish, thus making race-
63. Id. at 130-31.
64. Id. at 143 (Blackmun, J.) ("Our conclusion that litigants may not strike potential jurors
solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges.").
65. Id. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[P]erhaps when the Court refers to 'impermissible
stereotypes,' it means the adjective to be limiting rather than descriptive-so that we can expect
to learn from the Court's peremptory/stereotyping jurisprudence in the future which stereotypes
the Constitution frowns upon and which it does not.") (citation omitted).
66. Id. at 161-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 162 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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discrimination claims more likely to arise.7 The difficulty in estab-
lishing a gender-discrimination claim during voir dire suggests that
every dismissal of a prospective juror will not contain a potential gen-
der-based claim. Thus, the real consequence of J.E.B. is less, not
more, collateral litigation than that created by Batson, and the empiri-
cal evidence of J.E.B.'s impact on collateral litigation suggests the
same. 72
Although the impact on collateral litigation and the voir dire
process predicted by the dissent in J.E.B. has failed to materialize, the
Supreme Court has sub silentio chosen not to extend Batson beyond the
context of gender-based peremptory challenges.73 In doing so, it has
complied with what Justice O'Connor urged in her concurrence in
J.E.B.: that the Court limit the holding in that case to gender-based
peremptory challenges.74 On the heels of the J.E.B. decision, the
Court denied certiorari in Davis v. Minnesota,7 an appeal based on the
Minnesota Supreme Court's refusal to extend Batson to religion-based
peremptory challenges.76
D. Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges at the Federal Level
The Minnesota State Supreme Court's refusal to extend Batson
to religion-based peremptory challenges arose from a case where a
prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to remove an African Ameri-
can Jehovah's Witness from the jury.77 The defendant issued a Batson
challenge and established a prima facie case of race discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.7" When the burden shifted
to the state to justify the challenge with a legitimate reason, the prose-
cutor explained that Jehovah's Witnesses are reluctant to exercise au-
thority over their fellow man and asserted that she would never fail to
strike them given the opportunity. 79  On appeal, the defense argued
that Batson applied to religion-based peremptory strikes, but the Min-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 908. In the first five years after J.E.B., only twenty-three cases were reversed and
only twenty-five cases were remanded based on that decision. Id. (citing cases from both the
federal and state court systems). A similar study on the effect of Batson on collateral litigation
revealed that over a seven-year period there were 1,156 Batson complaints in both federal and
state courts. Kenneth J. Melili, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 457 (1996). Of these challenges, 191 of
them were ultimately successful. Id. at 459.
73. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994).
74. 511 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Davis, 511 U.S. at 1115.
76. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994).





nesota State Supreme Court refused to extend Batson that far."0 It em-
phasized that Batson was a limited exception to peremptory challenges
and that the reasons for that exception were not present when a party
dismissed a juror solely on the basis of religion."1
In concluding that the compelling justifications for the extension
of Batson were absent, the court noted that use of peremptory chal-
lenges to discriminate against religion is neither frequent nor perva-
sive. 2 Unlike race-based discrimination, evidence of religion-based
discrimination through the use of peremptory strikes is minimal.8 3
With no evidence being presented to show widespread religious dis-
crimination in selecting juries, the court concluded that confidence in
the jury system is not undermined when a party exercises a religion-
based peremptory challenge. 4
After failing to convince the Minnesota State Supreme Court that
religion-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional, the defen-
dant in Davis appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Although
the Minnesota State Supreme Court decided Davis prior to J.E.B., the
appeal arrived shortly after the J.E.B. decision. For that reason, Jus-
tices Thomas and Scalia voted to grant certiorari and wrote that the
case should be remanded and decided in light of the J.E.B. opinion,
which undermined the Minnesota State Supreme Court's premise that
Batson limited the Equal Protection Clause challenges to race-based
peremptory challenges.8 5 In spite of this urging, a majority of justices
voted to deny certiorari.8 6 By doing so, the Court tacitly adopted the
reasoning of the Minnesota State Supreme Court and indirectly ad-
hered to Justice O'Connor's plea in J.E.B. that the equal protection
constitutional restrictions on the use of peremptory challenges should
be limited to race- and gender-based challenges.
The dissent from the denial of certiorari was an attempt to call
the bluff of those in J.E.B. who so vigorously supported extending
Batson to gender. Justice Thomas noted, "J.E.B. would seem to have
extended Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes ... based on
80. Id. at 771.
81. Id. At the time the Minnesota State Supreme Court made its decision, the United
States Supreme Court had yet to rule on the issue presented by J.E.B. This explains why the
Davis court emphasized that Batson was a limited exception to the peremptory challenge and
why Justice Thomas argued that the case needed to be re-evaluated in the context of J.E.B. See
Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1118 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994).
83. Id. at 771.
84. Id.
85. See Davis, 511 U.S. at 1118.
86. Id. at 1116.
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religion."87 If J.E.B. was based on the conclusion that gender-based
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause because
they do not withstand heightened scrutiny, then religion-based per-
emptory challenges must also violate the Clause because religion-
based classifications fall within the same sphere of protected categories
as gender-based classifications. 8 In other words, the dissent posed the
logical question of how religion-based peremptory challenges can be
substantially related to an important government objective when gen-
der-based peremptory challenges are not. This explains the dissent's
conclusion that the justices who refused to grant certiorari were un-
willing to face the intellectual implications of the J. E. B. decision. 9
Although the United States Supreme Court refused to address
whether religion-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, many states have addressed the issue and decided that
such peremptory challenges violate their state constitutions.9" These
decisions exemplify the states' power to grant broader protections to
their citizens than the Federal Constitution and the states' willingness
to exercise this prerogative. Although Washington courts have tradi-
tionally interpreted the state's constitution independently of its federal
counterpart, they have yet to address the constitutionality of religion-
based peremptory challenges. There is ample support for the conclu-
sion that such challenges violate the Washington State Constitution.
III. WASHINGTON'S INDEPENDENT APPROACH AND RELIGION-
BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. State Courts' Independent Interpretation of Fundamental Rights
It is unclear what led state courts to begin construing state con-
stitutions as being more protective than the Federal Constitution, but
former Justice William Brennan suggests that the trend began after
the United States Supreme Court retreated from, or at least temporar-
ily suspended, the extension "of the federal Bill of Rights and the re-
straints of the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment" to the states.91 Far from implying that states
should avoid this extension, Brennan concludes that it is fitting and
proper for the states to do so.92
87. Id. at 1117.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Hightower, supra note 7, at 902.
91. Brennan, supra note 2, at 495.
92. Id. at 502.
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State courts should not necessarily be content with those protec-
tions guaranteed by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal
Constitution, because state laws are vital as an independent and pro-
tective force for fundamental liberties.93 When state courts extend
fundamental liberties under state constitutions beyond the guarantees
of the Federal Constitution, it is not necessarily a repudiation of Su-
preme Court precedent, but rather an acknowledgement "that the de-
cisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of ques-
tions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law.94
Brennan exhorts state courts to scrutinize the Supreme Court
precedent for sound and trenchant analysis before assigning those de-
cisions conclusive weight as signposts to state constitutional interpre-
tation.95 By scrutinizing the Court's analysis of issues involving fun-
damental liberties, state courts fulfill a federalism role as a counterpart
of a "double source of protection for the rights of our citizens."96
When the federal judiciary limits its role as the federal half of this
"double source of protection," it becomes imperative for the state
courts to "thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the
struggle to protect the people of our nation from governmental intru-
sions on their freedoms. "
97
Treatment of religion-based peremptory challenges at the state
level demonstrates the state courts' willingness to interpret state con-
stitutions more broadly than their federal counterpart. Many states
have extended Batson and J.E.B. to religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges. For example, the courts of California,9" Colorado,9 9 Connecti-
cut,1°° Florida,' Hawaii, 1°2 Massachusetts,' 3 Mississippi,' °4 New Jer-
93. Id. at 491.
94. Id. at 502.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 503.
97. Id.
98. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the exercise of a
peremptory challenge to remove a juror on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity violates the
California Constitution).
99. Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1155 (Colo. 1987) (finding that religion-based per-
emptory challenges violate a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial under the United States
Constitution and the Colorado State Constitution).
100. State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (Conn. 1999) (holding that religion-based peremp-
tory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause).
101. Nunez v. State, 664 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that the
Florida State Constitution prohibits religion-based peremptory challenges).
102. State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990) (holding that the Hawaii State Con-
stitution prohibits a party from excluding a juror on the basis of religion, race, gender, or ethnic-
ity).
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sey, 1°5 New York,11 6 and North Carolina..7 have all found that, at least
in certain circumstances, religion-based peremptory challenges are
forbidden under their respective state constitutions. Although Wash-
ington courts have yet to address the constitutionality of religion-
based peremptory challenges, there is strong support for concluding
that such challenges violate the state constitution.
B. Washington Courts' Independent Interpretation of Fundamental
Rights
In his seminal article on Washington courts' tradition of inter-
preting the state constitution more broadly than its federal counter-
part, former Washington State Supreme Court Justice Robert Utter
supports independent interpretation of the Washington State Consti-
tution and provides a guide on how and when Washington courts
should do so.' In State v. Gunwall, the Washington State Supreme
Court incorporated much of his reasoning in pronouncing the stan-
dard for determining when it is appropriate to interpret the state con-
stitution independently of the Federal Constitution. 109
Among the justifications for independent interpretation of the
state constitution is the United States Supreme Court's express recog-
nition that state courts have the power to interpret state constitutions
to provide more protection to individuals than the Federal Constitu-
tion."0 This grant of leeway emanates from the presupposition that "a
considerable measure of cooperation must exist in a truly effective fed-
eralist system.' In addition to allowing state courts to fulfill a role
as part of a dual protectorate of fundamental rights, the grant furthers
the principle "that the states be left free to try a broad range of social,
political, and legal experiments."1
2
103. Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E. 2d 499, 516 (Mass. 1979) (concluding that a per-
emptory challenge based on gender, race, religion, or national origin violates the Massachusetts
State Constitution).
104. Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d 590, 594 (Miss. 1998) (holding that religion-based per-
emptory challenges violate the Mississippi State Constitution).
105. State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1154 (N.J. 1986) (holding that a prosecutor may not
use peremptory challenges to strike a prospective juror on the basis of religion, race, ancestry,
national origin, or gender under the New Jersey State Constitution).
106. People v. Langston, 641 N.Y.S. 2d 513, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that relig-
ion-based peremptory challenges violate the New York State Constitution).
107. State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d 917, 921-23 (N.C. 1994) (holding that the North Carolina
State Constitution forbids religion-based peremptory challenges).
108. See Utter, supra note 3.
109. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986).
110. Utter, supra note 3, at 493.
111. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 60, 720 P.2d at 812.
112. Utter, supra note 3, at 496.
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The structural difference between the Washington State Consti-
tution and its federal counterpart also favors independent interpreta-
tion of the state constitution." 3 While the Federal Constitution grants
strictly described enumerated powers to the federal government, the
Washington State Constitution is a set of "limitations on the otherwise
plenary power of state governments to do anything not expressly for-
bidden by the state constitutions or federal law."' 14 Thus, state consti-
tutional provisions regarding fundamental rights tend to be more de-
tailed and specific because they are all that stand between the people
and the plenary police power of the state." 5 Because of the differences
in constitutional structures, state constitutions often vouchsafe fun-
damental rights that are not provided for by the Federal Constitu-
tion. "'
Additionally, the Washington State Constitution and the judici-
ary responsible for interpreting it tend to be more sensitive to areas of
local concern. 117 In contrast to the Federal Constitution, the state con-
stitution is easier to amend, was authored more recently, and is inter-
preted by elected, rather than appointed, judges. As such, the state
constitution is more indicative of, and amenable to, local concerns
than the Federal Constitution." 8 Moreover, the United States Su-
preme Court must not only be cognizant of its more limited role as an
unelected and unrepresentative judiciary, but it must also address con-
cerns of the nation and formulate holdings reflective of the "lowest
common denominator of individual rights." 119
Furthermore, Washington borrowed much of its Declaration of
Rights from other state constitutions, not from the Federal Bill of
Rights. 2 ' When the Washington State Constitution was ratified, the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. 2 ' It makes little sense, then,
for Washington courts to interpret the state constitution, one based on
other state constitutions rather than the federal charter, entirely con-
sistent with the Federal Bill of Rights, which did not apply to the
states when the state constitution was framed.'22
Finally, at the time the Washington State Constitution was de-
veloped, federal law was not nearly as ubiquitous as it is today, so "[i1t
113. Id. at 494-95.
114. Id.




119. Id. at 496.
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is extremely unlikely that the Washington framers ... intended that
the federal constitution and courts should have any significant role in
interpreting or setting limits on the interpretation of Washington's
constitution. "123 After all, one hundred years and an entire continent
separated the framers of the respective documents. 124 It is only natu-
ral, then, to assume that the intent behind the documents differed just
as much as the conditions that gave rise to them and the men who
wrote them.
125
The justifications for independent analysis of the Washington
State Constitution compel the Washington courts to look there first
when the issue is one of fundamental rights. 126 However, determining
when to approach a constitutional issue differently than the federal
courts and establishing a framework for doing so is as important, if not
more so, as the broad normative values behind independent interpre-
tation. 127 It is easier to find instances of independent interpretation of
state constitutions than it is to structure a guide that indicates when
state courts should use their power to chart their own course.'28
The presence of a consistent framework for independent state
constitutional interpretation reduces the likelihood of the courts' re-
sult-oriented application of the state constitution. Also, adherence to
an articulable and viable framework for appropriate state constitu-
tional analysis establishes state precedent that discourages attorneys
from making "naked castings into the constitutional sea.'
129
Washington law has developed such a framework for deciding when to
follow federal jurisprudence and when to follow its own
constitution. 3 This framework can be utilized to decide whether
religion-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional under the
Washington State Constitution.
123. Id. at 498.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 524.
127. Id. at 492.
128. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
129. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 813 (quoting In re Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d
1353, 1359 (1986)).
130. Id. at 61,720 P.2d at 812.
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C. State v. Gunwall: A Guide to Independent Constitutional
Interpretation in Washington
In State v. Gunwall, the Washington State Supreme Court for-
mulated what is now the standard by which Washington courts de-
termine whether the state constitution should be interpreted as more
protective of individual rights than the Federal Constitution."' The
following nonexclusive factors are relevant to that determination: (1)
the text of the state constitution; (2) textual differences between the
federal and state constitutions; (3) constitutional and common law his-
tory; (4) pre-existing state law; (5) structural differences between the
federal and state constitutions; and (6) whether the issue is a matter of
local or national concern.
3 2
The first and the second factors, the text of the Washington State
Constitution and the textual differences between the federal and state
constitutions, are intertwined. A reading of the text of the state con-
stitution leads to questions about how its text differs from the text of
its federal counterpart. For example, a state provision may be more
detailed or differently worded than its federal cognate.'33 It may also
govern a matter not explicitly found in the Federal Constitution.134
Thus, a state constitutional provision more explicit than, or different
from, its federal counterpart or a provision covering a matter not ad-
dressed by the Federal Constitution may justify a deviation from fed-
eral precedent.'35
The third factor requires an inquiry into case law interpreting the
provision at issue and, if necessary, into the constitutional history of
the provision.'36 The history of the adoption of a particular provision
or state case law illuminating that provision may support independent
interpretation of that provision, separate from federal interpretation of
the parallel federal provision.'37
The fourth factor, pre-existing state law, recognizes that pre-
existing bodies of state law, including statutory law, may show a "long
history and tradition of strict legislative protection" of certain funda-
mental rights before a state court confronts issues concerning those
rights.'38 In other words, pre-existing state protection of a matter cur-
131. Id. at61-62, 720 P.2dat811.
132. Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.





138. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
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rently before a court may establish "distinctive state constitutional
rights" and "help to define the scope" of those state-based rights. 3 '
Under the fifth factor, a court must examine structural differ-
ences between the federal and state constitutions. 14  This criterion
recognizes that the Federal Constitution is one of enumerated powers,
while the state constitution limits the otherwise plenary power of the
state government.' In issues involving individual liberties, the state
constitution may then guarantee broader protections than its federal
counterpart. 142 Furthermore, one must read particular provisions of
the Washington State Constitution in relation to the entire document
and compare that structural relation with that of the Federal Constitu-
tion.
The sixth factor recognizes that it may be more appropriate to
address areas of local concern under the aegis of the state constitution,
rather than looking to the federal interpretation of the Federal Consti-
tution for guidance.4 4 The fourth factor, pre-existing state law, may
also be pertinent here, as state legislation on the issue may conclu-
sively demonstrate that the issue is of local or state concern."' When
resolution of the question requires national uniformity, it is usually
appropriate to defer to decisions elucidated by the United States Su-
preme Court. 14 But, in matters where national uniformity is not nec-
essary or where the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, courts
often have a principled basis for interpreting the Washington State
Constitution independently.
D. Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges Under a Gunwall Analysis
The six factors announced in Gunwall create the backdrop for de-
termining whether religion-based peremptory challenges are imper-
missible under the Washington State Constitution. Application of the
Gunwall analysis establishes that such peremptory challenges are un-
constitutional in Washington.
1. The Text of Article I, § 11
Under the first Gunwall factor, there is strong textual support in
Article I, § 11 of the Washington State Constitution for protecting in-
139. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812.
140. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 813.
144. Id. at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
145. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
[Vol. 25:451
Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges
dividuals from religion-based peremptory challenges.146 The relevant
language of Article I, § 11 provides that no person "shall ... be in-
competent as a witness or juror, in consequence of his opinion on mat-
ters of religion . . . ." "' As a matter of plain language, Article I, § 11
protects a citizen's right to be a juror regardless of religious belief.
The language clearly suggests that no person shall be excluded
from the jury for religious reasons, though one might contend that Ar-
ticle I, § 11 applies only to the selection of the venire and leaves relig-
ion-based peremptory challenges unaffected. Article I, § 11 is thus
subject to two interpretations (1) it forbids removing a potential juror
under all circumstances involving matters of religion, or (2) it forbids
religion-based discrimination in compiling the venire, while allowing
such discrimination in the form of a peremptory challenge in selecting
the jury.
However, the plain language of Article I, § 11 and its logic favor
the former interpretation. The plain language of the text appears to
preclude any method of removing a juror "in consequence of his opin-
ion on matters of religion," while there is no language suggesting that
a citizen may not be excluded from the venire because of religious be-
lief, yet he or she may be excluded from the jury for the same reason.
Such a reading is logically inconsistent. To interpret the language this
way is tantamount to saying that an attempt to exclude a religious
group is impermissible in selecting the venire, yet acceptable during
voir dire if the discrimination occurs in the form of a peremptory chal-
lenge.
2. Textual Differences Between Article I, § 11 and the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment
Examining the second Gunwall factor reveals that Article I, § 11
of the Washington State Constitution has no exact federal counterpart.
No provision in the Federal Constitution provides that religious mat-
ters may not serve as a justification for a juror's incompetence."'
Thus, the principle that language in the state constitution not included
in the Federal Constitution may justify independent interpretation
supports independent analysis of Article I, § 11.149
Comparison of the First Amendment and Article I, § 11 also bol-
sters the argument that, in this instance, the Washington State Consti-
146. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
147. Id.
148. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....").
149. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
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tution should be interpreted more broadly. The Washington State
Supreme Court has recognized in a number of cases that material dif-
ferences in the language of the two documents justify a broader inter-
pretation of the state constitution.' ° In this instance, Article I, § 11
protects individuals from being considered "incompetent" as jurors for
religious reasons, while the First Amendment only protects an indi-
vidual's right to free exercise of religion from governmental infringe-
ment.
The text of Article I, § 11 also provides, "[a]bsolute freedom of
conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief, and worship,
shall be guaranteed to every individual."i' It further provides that "no
one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of
religion."' 2 Use of a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective
juror violates the guarantee of "freedom of conscience in all matters of
religious sentiment."''5 3 Similarly, excluding one from the jury on the
basis of religion molests or disturbs that individual "on account of re-
ligion."' 4 Because the text of the Washington document is specifi-
cally phrased to extend broader protection in religious matters than its
federal counterpart, finding religion-based peremptory challenges un-
constitutional harmonizes with the independent and broader protec-
tion granted under Article I, § 11.
3. Constitutional and Common Law History
The third Gunwall factor, inquiry into state common law, reveals
that there is a dearth of state common law interpreting Article I, § 11
in the context of jury trials. In State v. Leuch,"'5 the only case discuss-
ing the provision, the Washington State Supreme Court found that
conscientious objection to the death penalty was severable from one's
religious beliefs and could, therefore, serve as a reasonable and legally
cognizable basis for dismissing a juror for cause." 6 No violation of
Article I, § 11 occurred because the challenge for cause removed a ju-
ror with a bias that was completely distinguishable from the religious
basis for the belief.'" 7 Accordingly, the court held that the individual's
social belief in abolishing the death penalty, not the religious belief
150. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.




155. 198 Wash. 331, 88 P.2d 440 (1939).




from which it sprung, impeded his ability to remain impartial and
rendered him incompetent as a juror.
1 58
The Leuch court implied, in dicta, that the challenge for cause
would have been unconstitutional under Article I, § 11 had it been
based on the individual's religious belief and not on a severable social
belief.19 Specifically, by addressing the issue of Article I, § 11 in the
context of a challenge for cause, the court suggested that the provi-
sion's ban on religion-based discrimination in jury service applies be-
yond compilation of the venire to selection of the jury. 6° If Article I, §
11 applied only to selection of individuals for the venire, as the alter-
native reading of that provision suggests, then the provision would not
have been applicable in deciding whether dismissal of a juror for cause
on the basis of religion was permissible. As a matter of logic, if Article
I, § 11 forbids religion-based discrimination in the form of a challenge
for cause, it must also forbid such discrimination in the form of a per-
emptory challenge.
4. Pre-existing State Law
The fourth Gunwall factor, pre-existing state law, requires an ex-
amination of state law to discover if there is a "long history and tradi-
tion of strict legislative protection" of religious liberties in Washing-
ton. Washington has a strong tradition of granting broad statutory
protections in matters of religion. For instance, a Washington statute
makes it a crime to maliciously harass another for religious reasons. 6'
Another statute precludes religious questions on applications for em-
ployment or licenses in Washington.'62 Many provisions of the state's
statutes protect religious beliefs in the field of education.'63 In judicial
matters, prosecutorial decisions on whether to prosecute or plea bar-
gain are not to be based on religious bias.'64 Furthermore, persons
swearing an oath to testify may elect to be sworn according to religious
customs other than Christianity.'65
These extensive statutory protections of religious belief establish
distinctive state rights in matters of religion and support finding relig-
ion-based peremptory challenges impermissible on independent state




161. WASH. REV. CODE. § 9A.36.080 (2001).
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.01.100 (2001).
163. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.320.140, 28A.600.025, 28B.04.120 (2001).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.077 (2001).
165. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.28.040 (2001).
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that suggests a contrary view. Revised Code of Washington (RCW) §
2.36.080 provides that "[a] citizen shall not be excluded from jury ser-
vice in this state on account of race, color, religion, sex, national or-
gin, or economic status. ' 166 But the next portion of the statute ex-
plains that "[tihis section does not affect the right to peremptory
challenges" in Washington.'67 In forbidding discrimination in select-
ing the venire, while preserving the peremptory challenge, the statute
balances the compulsion to eradicate discrimination in jury service
against the desire to maintain peremptory challenges without render-
ing them nugatory. As such, this statute lends credence to the argu-
ment that Article I, § 11 does not limit the exercise of religion-based
peremptory challenges but only precludes religion-based discrimina-
tion when selecting the venire.
However, given the plain language of Article I, § 11, it is more
likely that the statute is, in fact, unconstitutional in preserving per-
emptory challenges on the basis of religion. When a constitutional
provision and a statutory provision conflict, the former trumps the lat-
ter and the latter must be struck down. Here, there are portions of the
statute, namely, those preserving peremptory challenges based on
"race" and "sex," which the Washington State Supreme Court has
found to be unconstitutional.
To the extent that the statute preserves peremptory challenges
based on "race" and "sex," it is already unconstitutional under both
the federal and state constitutions. As noted above, Batson and J.E.B.
limited the once universal coverage of peremptory challenges by find-
ing them impermissible when based on race or gender. 161 Many
Washington cases have discussed Batson's application in the state. 69
Although J.E. B., like Batson, applies in Washington, the Washington
State Court of Appeals in State v. Burch7' had already found gender-
based peremptory challenges impermissible under the Washington
equal rights amendment before the J.E.B. decision.' 7' These federal
and state decisions therefore invalidate RCW § 2.36.080 to the extent
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.080(3) (2001).
167. WASH. REV. CODE§ 2.36.080(4) (2001).
168. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 146 (gender).
169. See State v. Vreen, 99 Wash. App. 662, 994 P.2d 905 (2000); State v. Evans, 100
Wash. App. 757, 998 P.2d 373 (2000); State v. Sanchez, 72 Wash. App. 821, 867 P.2d 638
(1994); State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wash. App. 444, 859 P.2d 60 (1993).
170. 65 Wash. App. 828,830 P.2d 357 (1992).
171. Id. at 836, 830 P.2d at 362. The Washington State Court of Appeals followed the lead
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had already extended equal protection to gender-




that the statute authorizes race and gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges. Also, in light of the compelling reasons for finding religion-
based strikes unconstitutional under Article I, § 11, the statute is un-
constitutional to the extent that it authorizes religion-based discrimi-
nation in selecting the jury.
By finding gender-based peremptory challenges impermissible
under the Washington State Constitution before the United States Su-
preme Court addressed the issue in J. E. B., Washington courts demon-
strated their willingness to grant broader protections to individuals in
the context of peremptory challenges. The Burch opinion also con-
firms that in a face-off between constitutional and statutory guaran-
tees, the former must prevail over the latter. Thus, if a situation arises
concerning the constitutionality of religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges under the Washington State Constitution, there is no reason to
assume that RCW § 2.36.080 would necessarily govern the outcome of
an analysis under Article I, § 11 of the state constitution.
5. Structural Differences
Analysis of the fifth Gunwall factor demands examination of the
structural differences between the state constitution and its federal
counterpart. As previously noted, the structure of the Washington
State Constitution differs greatly from that of its federal counterpart,
and this difference can sometimes justify independent interpretation of
a legal issue on state constitutional grounds.172 In addition to the
aforementioned detailed textual differences between Article I, § 11 and
the First Amendment, the Washington State Constitution is a safe-
guard for individuals against the state, whose power is limited only by
the restrictions imposed by federal law and the state constitution. On
the other hand, the Federal Constitution "is a grant of limited power
authorizing the federal government to exercise only those constitu-
tionally enumerated powers expressly delegated to it by the states." '73
Because the state constitution is a source of guaranteed protection to
individuals from government intrusion, Article I, § 11 may be viewed
as providing explicit and expansive protection not provided by the
Federal Constitution. This enables Washington courts to forbid relig-
ion-based peremptory challenges, though they are currently permissi-
ble under the Federal Constitution.
The Washington State Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked
structural differences between the federal and state constitutions as a
justification for interpreting other provisions of the state document
172. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 66, 720 P.2d 808, 814 (1986).
173. Utter, supra note 3, at 494.
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more broadly than its federal counterpart. For example, in Manufac-
turing Housing Communities of Washington v. State,174 the court held
that Article I, § 16, the state's eminent domain clause, provided
greater protection to individual property owners than the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. 7 ' Likewise, as mentioned earlier,
Washington's court of appeals in State v. Burch relied on the Wash-
ington equal rights amendment to ban gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges before the United States Supreme Court extended that same
protection in J.E.B..170 Finally, in State v. Boland,'77 the Washington
State Supreme Court held that more detailed language in the state's
search and seizure clause provides broader protection to individuals
than the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights.178
All of these cases relied on the structural and textual differences
between the federal and state constitutions in extending greater
protection of fundamental liberties.'79 Similar textual and structural
differences are present when examining whether or not religion-based
peremptory challenges are impermissible under the state constitution.
When the structural and textual differences between the two constitu-
tions point to Washington framers' intent to more securely guarantee
individual liberties, it follows that state courts should closely scruti-
nize explicit textual provisions like Article I, § 11 that illuminate the
issue at hand.
6. Matters of Local Concern
Gunwall's sixth factor requires an inquiry into whether religion-
based peremptory challenges are of sufficient local interest to justify
finding them impermissible under the state constitution. The enu-
meration of Washington's statutes forbidding intrusion into religious
beliefs in a multitude of contexts illustrates that the protection of reli-
gious beliefs is a local priority.' 80 Furthermore, the decisions of other
states forbidding religion-based peremptory challenges on state consti-
tutional grounds suggest that there is a local flavor to peremptory
174. 142 Wash. 2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000).
175. Id. at 374, 13 P.3d at 196.
176. Burch, 65 Wash. App. at 836, 830 P.2d at 362 (1992).
177. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990).
178. Id. at 580, 800 P.2dat 1117.
179. As Justice Utter explained, "[o]rdinary rules of textual and constitutional interpreta-
tion, as well as the logic of federalism, require that meaning be given to the differences in lan-
guage between the Washington and United States Constitutions .. " Utter, supra note 3, at
515.
180. See supra notes 161-167.
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challenges that supports independent state determination of the is-
sue. 1
8 1
To the extent that peremptory challenges are authorized in all
state and federal courts in both civil and criminal trials, they are a
matter of national concern. However, the widespread presence of per-
emptory challenges does not necessarily establish a need for national
uniformity. A state that forbids religion-based peremptory challenges
does not impair the use of such challenges in other state or federal
courts. If there were a need for national uniformity, the United States
Supreme Court would have already addressed the issue, rather than
leaving it to the state courts to decide the issue on their own. As al-
ready noted, a multitude of states have banned religion-based peremp-
tory challenges under their own state constitutions. Thus, numerous
Washington statutes protecting religious liberties, numerous state
court decisions banning religion-based peremptory challenges, as well
as the willingness of the United States Supreme Court to leave the is-
sue in the hands of individual states point to the conclusion that the
issue of religion-based peremptory challenges is of sufficient local in-
terest to support independent interpretation of Article I, § 11 on the
issue.
Application of the six nonexclusive Gunwall factors establishes
that there are compelling reasons for banning religion-based peremp-
tory strikes under the Washington State Constitution. However, the
Gunwall analysis does not formulate a new standard for evaluating re-
ligion-based peremptory strikes and does not indicate whether em-
barking on such a path will nullify the benefits of peremptory chal-
lenges to the point that their continued existence will become
endangered. By establishing a standard similar to that used in
evaluating race- and gender-based peremptory challenges,
Washington courts can eradicate religion-based discrimination in the
jury selection process as dictated by Article I, § 11 while, at the same
time, ensuring that the peremptory challenge remains a useful
instrument in molding the jury.
IV. A NEW STANDARD FOR EVALUATING RELIGION-BASED
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Washington's standard for evaluating race- and gender-based
peremptory challenges is based on the federal standard. There is no
reason to deviate from the current standard, but there are some peculi-
181. Seesupra notes 98-107.
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arities involved in religion-based peremptory strikes that courts should
account for when assessing challenges to such strikes.
In assessing claims of race and gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges, Washington courts follow the federal standard. First, a party
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that
the peremptory challenge was used against a member of a constitu-
tionally protected group and that the surrounding circumstances cre-
ate an inference that the challenge was based on the individual's mem-
bership in that group.'82  If a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination is established, the other party must then proffer a neu-
tral justification related to the case. 183 At that point, the trial court
must determine the legitimacy of the proffered reason for the strike
and rule accordingly.'84
This standard is appropriate for evaluating religion-based per-
emptory challenges, but the close relationship between a religious be-
lief and a societal belief emanating from that faith requires courts to be
wary when assessing such claims. The relationship becomes impor-
tant when evaluating whether a party's proffered reason for dismissing
a potential juror is neutral or a mere pretext for discriminating against
the member of the venire on the basis of religion. Judge Richard Pos-
ner discussed this matter in United States v. Stafford:85
It is necessary to distinguish among religious affiliation, a relig-
ion's general tenets, and a specific religious belief. It would be
improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror on the
basis of his being a Catholic, a Jew, a Muslim, etc. It would be
proper to strike him on the basis of a belief that would prevent
him from basing his decision on the evidence and instructions,
even if the belief had a religious backing; suppose for example
that his religion taught that crimes should be left entirely to the
justice of God. In between and most difficult to evaluate from
the standpoint of Batson is a religious outlook that might make
the prospective juror unusually reluctant, or unusually eager, to
convict a criminal defendant.'86
Borrowing this analysis aids in the determination of whether a
party exercised an impermissible religion-based peremptory challenge
or instead removed a potential juror for a neutral reason related to the
particular trial. Any strike based solely on religious affiliation is im-
182. State v. Burch, 65 Wash. App. 828, 840, 830 P.2d 357, 364 (1992); State v. Evans, 100
Wash. App. 757, 769, 998 P.2d 373, 380 (2000).
183. Evans, 100 Wash. App. at 764, 998 P.2d at 378.
184. Id.




permissible. For example, a party may not use a peremptory strike to
remove a Catholic solely because he is Catholic. Courts should not
accept as a defense to a religion-based peremptory challenge "the very
stereotype the law condemns."' 87 Assumptions about an individual's
ability as a juror based solely on the individual's religion represents
the very stereotype that a ban on religion-based peremptory challenges
would seek to prevent. Thus, a party may not strike a prospective ju-
ror only for affiliation with a particular religion.
On the other hand, it would be permissible to strike a member of
the venire when a particular personal belief derived from religion
would completely interfere with the juror's ability to remain impartial.
In Judge Posner's example, a party could dismiss a member of a relig-
ion that believes all punishment for crimes should be left to God be-
cause such a peremptory challenge would not discriminate on the basis
of religion but would merely discharge a juror unable to impartially
weigh the evidence. Of course, the dismissal would only be appropri-
ate if the individual actually possessed the belief espoused by his relig-
ion, affecting his ability to remain impartial.
The most difficult evaluations will involve beliefs that may ren-
der the juror either overly reticent or zealous in convicting a criminal
defendant. For example, if a defendant strikes a member of the Na-
tion of Islam and seeks to justify the strike by proffering that members
of that group tend to be teetotalers, such explanation may or may not
justify the strike when the striker's defense in the case is intoxication.
The difficulty lies in assessing whether a peremptory strike on "these
societal views should be attributed to a pernicious religious bias," '188
and the answer will depend on the case's circumstances and the trial
judge's discretion. In our example, the justification may be neutral
because the juror's belief in abstinence may make him skeptical to a
defense based on intemperance. On the other hand, the justification
may merely cloak a categorical bias that members of the juror's relig-
ion are unable to remain impartial regardless of the individual's ability
to remain impartial.
From the above points and examples, one can carve out a guide-
line for assessing whether a proffered reason for exercising a religion-
based peremptory challenge is truly neutral. When a party strikes a
juror for nothing more than religious affiliation, a court should forbid
the peremptory strike. However, when a party strikes a juror whose
religious belief completely precludes objective evaluation of the case,
the court should uphold the peremptory strike. When religious beliefs
187. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,410 (1991).
188. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994).
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may make a juror more or less inclined to one side, the trial judge
must balance the proffered reason for the strike against the circum-
stances of the case and determine whether the reason is significantly
related to the juror's ability to evaluate the case or is instead pretext
for a peremptory challenge based on pernicious religious bias.
Washington courts may be reluctant to ban religion-based per-
emptory challenges out of a concern that such an extension is only one
more step down a slippery slope that will eventually lead to the demise
of the peremptory challenge. Nothing in this Comment suggests that
further limits should be placed on peremptory challenges beyond reli-
gious bias. In fact, the impetus behind forbidding religion-based per-
emptory challenges in Washington is Article I, § 11, which indicates
that such challenges are incongruous with the Washington State Con-
stitution.
Opponents of forbidding religion-based peremptory strikes point
to the infrequency with which such strikes arise. Infrequent occur-
rence, however, is not an argument against a constitutional mandate.
When religion-based discrimination occurs in jury selection, it un-
dermines confidence in the jury system and stigmatizes the venire
member for having particular religious beliefs. The infrequency of re-
ligion-based peremptory challenges serves as better evidence against
the claim that forbidding them will lead to the inevitable demise of the
peremptory challenge.
The rare occurrence of such strikes also counters the claim that
banning them will result in collateral litigation to the point that voir
dire will become a sideshow, eventually overshadowing the trial. The
predicted increase in distracting litigation has not materialized in the
context of gender-based peremptory challenges, and nothing indicates
that the result will be any different if religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges are banned. Commentators warned that attacks on gender-
based peremptory challenges would arise upon every strike, since
those strikes always involve a male or a female and are thus loaded
with a potential claim of gender discrimination. If such a prediction
has not materialized in those instances, there is no reason to suspect
that collateral litigation would increase in instances involving religion
given that the juror's religion is often unknown to the party striking
the juror.
Because a viable framework exists for evaluating whether a party
has exercised a religion-based peremptory challenge that will not
eradicate the continued viability of peremptory challenges as a treas-
ured tool of jury selection, the Washington State Supreme Court
should establish this framework for the state's lower courts to apply in
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future cases involving religion-based peremptory challenges. Imple-
menting this framework will ensure that Washington courts comply
with the Washington State Constitution's mandate under Article I, §
11 that no person "shall... be incompetent as a witness or juror, in-
consequence of his opinion on matters of religion."
1 89
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue
of the continued viability of religion-based peremptory challenges un-
der the Equal Protection Clause, there is ample evidence that the
Washington judiciary has strong grounds to proceed with its own in-
dependent and broader interpretation of its State Constitution on the
issue, as many other state courts have already done.
Extending protection to those discriminated against on religious
grounds through the exercise of a peremptory challenge harmonizes
with the Washington tradition of independent state constitutional in-
terpretation. Independent interpretation, when tempered and proper,
fulfills a grant that the United States Supreme Court has expressly
recognized that the Federal Constitution gives to the States. Wash-
ington courts have faithfully and consistently exercised this grant, and
eliminating religion-based peremptory challenges is within the pur-
view of this grant.
The propriety of eliminating religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges is confirmed by a Gunwall analysis, which is the Washington
framework for determining when it is appropriate to interpret the state
constitution independently of the Federal Constitution. The six non-
exclusive Gunwall factors establish that religion-based discrimination
in the form of a peremptory challenge is impermissible under Article
I, § 11 of the Washington State Constitution. The text of Article I, §
11, textual differences between Article I, § 11 and the First Amend-
ment, case law interpreting Article I, § 11, widespread statutory pro-
tection of religion in Washington, structural differences between the
federal and state constitutions, and the lack of need for national uni-
formity on the issue all point to this conclusion.
Finding religion-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional
in Washington requires no deviation from the current standard used
to evaluate race and gender-based peremptory challenges. The only
difference in using the standard to evaluate religion-based peremptory
challenges is the small caveat that a trial judge may, on rare occasions,
have to distinguish between the impermissible use of a peremptory
189. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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strike to remove a juror based on religious bias and the permissible use
of a peremptory strike to remove a juror unable to remain impartial
because of a societal belief emanating from a religious belief.
Moreover, extending constitutional protection in this area does
not necessitate extension of the same principle to other areas, the even-
tual demise of the peremptory challenge, or excessive collateral hear-
ings within the main trial. Because the basis for finding religion-based
peremptory challenges impermissible in Washington is Article I, §11,
the holding would be limited to matters of religion since the provision
speaks only to protection of religious liberties. Furthermore, religion-
based peremptory strikes are infrequent, so the concerns about exces-
sive mini-hearings, prolonging voir dire, and eviscerating the peremp-
tory challenge are misplaced. In fact, the similar conclusions of other
states on this issue and the continued viability of peremptory chal-
lenges in those states assure that the peremptory challenge will remain
intact. Consequently, the peremptory challenge will only be tailored
to prevent religion-based discrimination in selecting the jury for trial,
and it will thus retain its status as a treasured tool for shaping a more
impartial jury.
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